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ABSTRACT
In its first part, the present essay focuses on one main thesis.  The transition to full EMU and the
introduction of the euro will have a more lasting effect on European banking than the previous Single
Market Project (Europe 1992).  They deal directly with money, the basic material of banking, and
they pave the way to more aggressive bank strategies.  In conjunction with other factors, they not
only induce “accommodating” reactions, mainly through cost-cutting, but also “autonomous
restructurings” : less intermediation, more market activities and, most of all, external growth through
M(ergers) and A(cquisitions).  This significantly changes the structure and the policies of European
banking.
Recently important and controversial M and A have occurred in the Benelux area.  In the second part
of the essay, these developments are analysed in the just described framework.  After a global
overview two case studies are presented : ABN-AMRO, n° 1 in the Netherlands; the GENERALE
BANK, n° 1 in Belgium.  The main conclusion is that the rationale behind the recent M and A is not
mere size, but also accelerated rationalisation and penetration in foreign domestic markets, which
was previously hampered by defensive and ultimately self-defeating strategies of strengthening the
mere national domestic base.  However, at the present stage, the importance of institutional
resistance, even in small neighbouring countries, should not be under-estimated.  Hence, cross-
border restructurings in European banking will only increase gradually.
Key words : EMU, euro, bankstrategies, Benelux financial systems.
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BANK STRATEGIES IN EUROLAND
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE BENELUX ARIA 1
INTRODUCTION :
CHANGING EMPHASIS IN EUROPEAN BANK STRATEGIES
In a survey of European banking and bankers carried out in 1993 by Arthur ANDERSEN, the EU
Single Market Programme (the “Europe 1992” project”) was ranked first as a major driving force for
the bank strategies in the years to come.  Nevertheless, in a postal survey organised some years
later (1995-1996) in the framework of the Single Market Review, the same factor ranked only fifth in
the list (see figure 1).  Technological change, domestic competition and domestic regulatory
developments appeared to be the fundamental factors influencing bank strategies.
FIGURE 1 - THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS INFLUENCING BANK
STRATEGIES
Factor influencing strategy
Arthur Andersen
(1993) 1 Postal survey ²
Technological change
Competition from domestic firms
Competition between banks and non-banks
Domestic regulatory developments
EU Single Market Programme
Competition from financial firms in other EU countries
Competition from financial firms in other non-EU countries
5
*
2
4
1
3
3
83
76
68
65
65
53
47
* Not available
1 Ranking
² Where 0 is “not important”, 25 is “of little importance”, 50 is “quite important”, 75 is “very important”, and 100 is
Source : European survey by Arthur Andersen carried out in 1993 and postal survey.
Source : Economic Research Europe (ERE) for the European Commission, 1997, table 4.38.
                                                        
1 A preliminary and incomplete version of the present essay was presented at the seminar on “The changeover to
euro-fixed exchange rates, competition among EU countries and strategies of European banks”, jointly organised by
the Associazone per lo Sviluppo degli Studi di Banca e Borsa and the Università Cattolica del S. Cuore, Secunda
Facoltà di Economia at Angera on June 18-19, 1998.  The present version has very much benefited from the
discussion at this seminar and at the Annual Meeting of the European Association of University Teachers in Banking
and Finance (Paris, September 1998).  Valuable comments and corrections have been provided by Pierre Gilard,
Dirk Heremans, Gaston Reinesch, Patrick Van Cayseele, Rudi Vander Vennet and Jerry Van Waterschoot.  The
author also gratefully acknowledges the help of the Belgian Bankers Association, the Netherlands Institute for
Banking and Stockbrokering Industry, the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance and the Studies Department of the
Artesia Bank Brussels, in collecting information and data.
2.
One of the reasons mentioned by the authors is : “The SMP has become implemented and more
effective during 1992-96, .. its specific (perceived) impact on bankers’ strategies has apparently
reduced” (p. 109).  My explanation is that the SMP exerted its influence in conjunction with other
driving forces.  It worked mainly in an indirect and defensive way : “The Single Market Programme
exerted its main influence via national deregulation and modernization.  The interaction and the
combination of European integration and national deregulation increased the contestability of
domestic financial markets.  It induced the major domestic banks in various countries to strengthen
their domestic base in order to avoid effective penetration by competitors, both domestic and foreign.
The outcome was twofold : increased domestic competition and reduction of profitability for the major
domestic banks, higher cost of entry into foreign customer markets, particularly in Northern and
Western Europe” (Abraham, 1997 a, p. 362-363).
In a more recent paper (June 1998), W.R. WHITE identifies changes in technology, deregulation,
attitudes to shareholders value and demographic trends in the industrial countries as the “underlying
forces for change” in European banking.  In his opinion the euro may act as a catalyst for change but
it is the underlying forces that will play a more important role in shaping the direction of that change”
(p. 3).  The implicit conclusion seems to be that the impact of the euro will be significant, but
temporary.
The main thesis of the present paper is that the transition to full EMU (Stage Three) and the
introduction of the euro also act in conjunction with other factors, which are now technological
change, consolidation and globalisation.  But its direct and specific influence is much more decisive
and will have a more lasting impact than the SMP on the structure and the activity of financial
markets and financial institutions.  First, monetary integration with a single currency affects banking
activity much more directly than the creation of a single market of goods and services, which also,
but not primarily, includes financial services.  In EMU, moneyby definition holds the stage and the
banks are the prominent money changers and money dealers.  They have to secure the conversion
from national currencies into the euro, they will be the most important players on the financial
markets of Euroland.
Secondly, the transition to full EMU makes more defensive strategies which only focus on
strengthening and protecting the national domestic base increasingly self-defeating and obsolete.
Euroland paves the way to and offers opportunities to a more aggressive approach to bank strategy.
x
x   x
The first section of the present paper very briefly describes the various channels through which full
EMU affects banking activity, and analyses its impact on several archetypes of bank strategies.
In the second section we focus on the changes of bank strategies in the three Benelux countries.
After a general overview, two cases will be discussed : ABN-AMRO (Netherlands) and Generale
Bank (Belgium).
SECTION 1 :
THE GENERAL IMPACT ON BANK ACTIVITY AND STRATEG Y
1.1 FOUR CHANNELS OF IMPACT ON BANK ACTIVITY
The transition of full EMU and the introduction of the euro influence banking activity in many
ways.  They have been analysed in a vast literature and are discussed almost daily in
meetings and seminars.  They have stimulated the drafting and the implementation of
“schémas de place” in several financial centres and of “Europrojects” in hundreds of financial
institutions.
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For the purpose of the present paper, which focuses on bank strategies, it will do to identify
the main channels through which full EMU bears on bank activity and to list, in a not
exhaustive way, the most significant effects channelled.
Channel 1 : The direct effects of introducing a single currency and a centralised monetary
policy :
- crossing out, by one stroke, all forex transactions and/or interest arbitrage in national
currencies within the euro-zone;
- blurring the distinction between domestic and cross-border payments within the euro-
zone with its implications on clearing, transfer and settlement systems;
- shifting the attention of financial institutions from currency risk to market and credit risks;
- building a single yield curve for all financial institutions in the zone;
- introducing minimum reserve requirements in the countries of the euro-zone where they
did not exist before.  This reduces the attractiveness of previously off-shore financial
centres within the euro-zone (Luxembourg) and increases the attractiveness of the
financial centres outside the zone (London, Zürich) etc.
Channel 2 : The effects through changes in financial markets :
- reducing the number of markets e.g. merger of different types of exchanges, nationally
and internationally;
- changing the absolute and/or relative size of the markets :
* shrinking of the forex markets especially those which concentrated on national
currencies of the euro-zone;
* shrinking of those derivatives markets which previously concentrated on transactions
in national currencies of the zone;
* relative shrinking of government bond markets as a result of the implementation of the
Maastricht criteria with respect to public finances;
- changing the activity of markets :
* reduced segmentation of markets;
* increased competition as a result of increased contestability of markets (easier entry
and more participants);
* new prospects for corporate debt : no longer crowding out of corporate by government
debt, more liquidity;
* new prospects of equity markets, less segmentation, more liquidity.
Channel 3 : Industry-specific effects :
- high transitional costs associated with conversion towards the euro, changes in IT
programmes and procedures, information and training programmes;
- increased pressure to overcome overbanking and to cut costs;
- increased pressure of desintermediation and competition from non-banks;
- generalisation of concentration movement.
Channel 4 : Firm-specific effects :
- significant burden of transitional costs (cf. supra);
- increased pressure to rationalise networks and cut costs (cf. supra);
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- challenge to reach higher minimum size in many banking “métiers” : increased pressure
towards economies of scale and scope;
- challenge to face the diversification-specialisation dilemma in the enlarged markets of the
euro-zone.
1.2 IMPACT ON BANK STRATEGIES : CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Since the beginning of the nineties, my colleagues and myself have been trying to build and
constantly adjust a conceptual framework for analysing bank strategies (cf. references at the
end of the present paper).  This framework has been derived from a supply-oriented
approach to bank strategy, according to which the strengths and weaknesses of an individual
institution - not the demand or regulatory conditions - should be the starting point for
designing and implementing its basic strategy.
In this context we identify two types of restructuring policies.
The accommodating type aims at (adapting) the micro-level of the banking firm to often
unforeseen developments in the macro-level of the economy and/or in the meso-level of
financial markets (Abraham and Lierman, 1990, p. 416).  The standard example of such a
strategy is a cost-cutting and internal rationalisation of the firm in order to overcome a drop in
profitability induced by stiffer competition, domestically or internationally.
In the autonomous restructuring type on the other hand, the strategy is based on the existing
resources of the bank and is explicitly oriented “towards maximising the comparative
advantages of the bank and minimising its comparative disadvantages in the financial
markets”.  It focuses on organic growth of the bank and/or external growth by mergers and
acquisitions or cooperative arrangements.
The standard example of organic growth is “the stand alone” policy of many medium-sized
banks which enjoy a reputation of solid and efficient management, excellent external
relations with clients and authorities and a favourable internal social climate.  In such a
strategy, growth is regular, but slow.  Relations banking is still important in the so-called
local, regional or national customers’ markets, but transactions banking is practised in the
globalised professional markets.  Revenue from intermediation remains important, although
declining in relative terms.
The standard example of external growth is provided by the emergence of mega-banks,
through wordwide mergers and acquisitions.  Such a strategy of “the biggest is the best”, or
in pejorative terms “the fattest is the fittest”, is based on market power, globalised asset
management and extensive worldwide corporate relations.  Activities are concentrated on
wholesale professional, not on retail markets.  Fee business and capital gains are the main
sources of income.
The empirical evidence on the economic gains of bank mergers remains mixed : “… While
there are some real gains in bank mergers, they appear to take place in mergers between
small banks.  This raises the question what motivates the megamergers in the banking
industry.  Evidence on the real economic gains produced by such mergers is quite
inconclusive” (Amihud and Miller, 1998, p. xi, mainly on the basis of the American
experience).
1.3 IMPACT ON BANK STRATEGIES : THE EURO CASE
How can such a conceptual framework be applied to the transition to full EMU and to the
introduction of the euro ?
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Obviously, full EMU and euro are developments at the macro-level.  But they were not
unforeseen.  They started with the Maastricht treaties in 1991-1992.  They were dramatically
interrupted by the currency crises in 1992-1993, but again put on the (right) political track
afterwards.  Historians will have to give credit to most banks in Continental Europe - not in
the Anglo-Saxon world - that they have constantly supported the move to full EMU in spite of
high transitional costs, in spite of vanishing forex income, in spite of the many difficulties and
growing pains which will presumably occur in the launching period of the euro.  Those banks
should rightly claim - in the banking tradition of “high risk, high return” that the future gains
(when ?) from the project should be reserved, at least partly, to those who took the risk of the
operation and not to those who stood by the side of the road, ready to ridicule those “naïve
It would seem that in this context a good deal of the bank strategies, at present, are of the
accommodating type, adjusting, both at the industry and at the firm level, to more intense
competition in a world of increased accessibility and contestability.  In this context the cost-
cutting objective stands high on the agenda.  But this is not new.  Cost-cutting has been a
“favourite” of banking strategies in Europe since the beginning of the nineties.  Until recently,
the performance was far from conclusive in several countries.  The ERE (1997) reports that
no overall improvement of cost-to-income ratios had been perceived (p. 87).  The striking
and paradoxical aspect of the cost-cutting drive in the nineties has been that, until very
recently, the rationalisation measures did not lead to a significant reduction of the branch
networks.  In Italy, they have even been extended after the removal of restrictions on the
geographic expansion of some credit institutions.  On the contrary, central overheads have
been cut almost everywhere (Abraham, 1997 a, p. 363).
The reasons for this relative “no-change” situation are well-known.  First, the impact of cost-
cutting devices on net profitability has been neutralised by “market share” strategies aiming
at strengthening the domestic base of the  bank.  In this context each local bank manager
claims that closing his branch will direct his customers to a competing bank and reduce the
market share of his own institution.  Secondly, branch networks are very labour-intensive.
Closing branches at a (very) fast rate immediately creates the threat of a “bain de sang
social”.  The prevailing philosophy in Euroland - which I share - is that the reduction of
networks should be gradual and spread over time.  It should be realised by favouring
voluntary departures, not by firing people.
This approach is now being challenged in the Anglo-Saxon world.  Striking here is the fact
that cost-cutting is no longer considered as the accommodating device of an individual bank,
but has become the dominant objective of mega-mergers.  In Europe, the same trend can be
seen in cases such as the merger of UBS and SBC in Switzerland (October 1997).  Dropping
13,000 jobs has been advertised as the main objective and the main benefit to be expected
from this mega-move.
In the context of the present discussion, it is to be feared that the transition to full EMU and
the introduction of the euro will be used as a pretext, an excuse, an alibi, for doing
“catastrophically” what should already have started as a regular accommodating device of a
bank whose profitability is unsatisfactory.  At the macro-level the Maastricht convergence
criteria and “Europe” in general, have already been used as scapegoats for budgetary
hardships, monetary restrictions and rising unemployment in Europe.  Many (though not all)
of the measures taken would have been necessary, also without monetary integration.  It
was, of course, easy to hide one’s own shortcomings under the European veil.  This should
not be repeated in financial restructurings in the euro-zone.
Coming now to the topic of autonomous restructuring policies, two distinct but not unrelated
moves seem to be highly relevant.  In both of them the transition to Euroland is at work, but
exerts its influence in conjunction with broader forces.
The first one is the sometimes frantic effort to check the impact of falling intermediation
margins by other sources of income : fees and capital gains.  This is a wordwide
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phenomenon which partly reflects the basic trend in Western financial systems to move from
a B (banking) system to an M (market) system.  However, as I argued elsewhere (Abraham,
1997 b, p. 62) the transition to an M system will “neither be general, nor automatic, nor
irreversible”.  How does the transition to full EMU fit into this picture ?
It is highly improbable that the transition to full EMU will reverse this trend.  In the process of
convergence within Euroland, the higher margins in some, mostly Southern European
countries, will probably adjust to the lower ones prevailing in N.W. Europe.  Moreover, if the
euro, as we expect it to do, acts as a catalyst for more aggressive policies beyond the
traditional national domestic base, the increased competition will normally exert pressure on
the margins.  This explains the efforts to increase other sources of income by moves as
bancassurance, asset management, involvement in primary and secondary equity markets.
However, one major qualification should be added to this too simple textbook analysis.  I
continue to share the J. Dermine’s (1995) opinion that, in the customers’ markets, banking
with a “single currency” does not mean banking in a uniform market, which would
indiscriminately cover the whole euro-zone.  There will remain ample room for customer-
linked, geographically, culturally and linguistically determined banking.  But this kind of
domestic bases will no longer be determined by national borders only.  Between these
regional markets some differentiation in interest rates and margins remains possible.
x
x   x
A second important change in autonomous restructuring concerns the balance between
organic internal and external growth, mostly through mergers and acquisitions.  It is striking
that in the last few years the balance has shifted significantly towards external growth.
In its two listings of the major European M and A since mid-1997, the European Banker
(1998) distinguishes three main motives, the first two ones being predominant : consolidation
(leading to cost-cutting, economies of scale and scope and other size effects), globalisation
(wordwide) and diversification (e.g. bancassurance).
In an interesting analysis in Revue Banque (1998), Gaël de Pontbriand quotes four objective
moving forces for European M and A : overbanking, size-effects, economies of scale and
scope, pressure of shareholders for better short-term financial performance.  But he adds
subjective herding effects (effet de troupeau).  More than sixty years ago, Keynes (1936)
wrote that the financial world is driven by “animal spirits”.  In that world people prefer to fail
conventionally, as members of the group, of the herd, rather than succeeding
unconventionally , as lonely trouble-makers.
However, as stressed in the survey of the present herding literature by Devenow and Welch
(1996) not all herding phenomena can be reduced to mere emotional, psychological
reactions. “Rational” herding occurs when it creates payoff externalities, e.g. when following
the herd makes for more depth and liquidity in financial markets; or, as suggested by some
principal-agent models and by mere observation in daily asset management, when
managerial performance evaluation is based not on absolute, but on relative performance
(perform better than the industry benchmark .. belong to the top five …).  Finally, “rational”
herding also exists in conditions of informational externalities when “agents gain useful
information from observing previous agents’ decision to the point where they optimally and
rationally completely ignore their own private information” (ibidem, p. 609).  This may explain
the decisions of firms to merge with others and the form by which such mergers are
accomplished (conglomeration, hostile takeovers, tender offers, etc.” (ibidem p. 610).
Whether this is “rational” or merely an expression of “animal spirits” is, in my opinion, often
unclear.
This type of analysis inevitably raises the question whether the present “euroforia” and the
concomitant wave of M and A in European banking is based on “rational herding” or, on the
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contrary, leads to inconsiderate restructurings and increased concentration, determined by
megalomania and mere emotional actions and reactions rather than by objective factors.
Recent M and A in- and outside the eurozone have not been homogeneous and uniform,
which excludes a straightforward and standard answer to the euroforia question.  The most
significant cases differ from one another by their motivation, the business lines concerned
and/or their geographical dimension (for these distinction, see Heremans and Van Cayseele,
1998).  Most operations are motivated by the need to strengthen the bank’s market position
and/or by rationalisation and cost-cutting through economies of scale or scope.  In this
respect, the standard answer to the euroforia question is that the impact of the euro through
the various channels mentioned above increases the minimum size required for many
categories of financial transactions, especially on the capital markets.  Organic growth is too
slow to reach that higher minimum size in due time to face the new challenge of Euroland.
External growth is necessary, first of all through horizontal (in the same business line) M and
A.  This argument makes sense in general.  However it is to be tested case by case,
especially when a bank tries to overcome the size-constraint by specialising is some métiers
or by niche playing in market segments (e.g. private banking) where attractive niches have
not (yet) become dirty stables with many competitors.
When rationalisation and cost reductioin are the main motives, the scope of direct cost-
cutting is much more limited in “diversification” mergers, where complementary activities,
business lines and institutions are merged, than in horizontal mergers, where the same line
of activities are consolidated.  In the latter case, the degree and the speed at which cost
reduction becomes effective and significant depends essentially on the way in which IT
platforms can be harmonised and unified and on the conditions under which personnel can
be reduced on socially acceptable terms.
Finally, as to the geographical dimension, the euro obviously eliminates an important factor
of market segmentation on a national basis.  But the other factors, like geographical, cultural
and linguistic “distance”, differences in various national and regional regulations etc. remain.
Their impact is undermined, but not destroyed by the transparency of a single currency.  To
overcome these obstacles and to penetrate foreign domestic markets, organic growth is
often inadequate in Euroland.  This paved the way for acquisitions of foreign networks and
institutions, in a shift to more aggressive autonomous restructuring.
In my opinion, although M and A on a national basis still remain predominant for huge
operations, this is one of the ways in which the transition to full EMU induces cross-border M
and A and exerts a distinct influence on autonomous restructuring, alongside the pure size
effect.  In conclusion, the present wave of M and A in Euroland can be explained by some
elements of “rational” herding, the relevance of which varies widely among several recent
cases.
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SECTION 2 :
EUROLAND IN THE BENELUX AREA
2.1 INTRODUCTION : THREE DIFFERENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS : ONE AREA ?
When dealing with the transition to full EMS in the Benelux area, one has to deal with three
financial systems which at first sight do not have much more in common than geographical
proximity, small domestic markets and some remainders of the Belgian Luxembourg Union
of 1922.  Key data on the three countries are presented in Table 1.
The differences are numerous :
(i) Belgium and the Netherlands have traditional on-shore financial markets.  Although
moving slowly to an on-shore status, under full EMU regime, Luxembourg has an off-
shore past, attracting the Belgian dentist wanting to escape the Belgian withholding tax
and German banks wanting to circumvent the German minimum reserve requirements.
(ii) The three financial systems have been internationalised, be it, at least initially, in a
different way (Abraham, Bervaes, Guinotte, 1994) : Belgium by an open-door policy
towards foreign banks, the Netherlands mainly through internationalisation of the
domestic banks, Luxembourg by attracting foreign banks through the opportunities of
off-shore banking.
(iii) The systems of corporate governance of financial institutions are widely different.  The
Dutch system is of the Anglo-Saxon type with, at least in the top banks, widely dispersed
shareholdership and extensive power of managers.  Moreover - in contrast with the
Anglo-Saxon example - the bank and its managers are protected from hostile take-over
bids and analogous devices by extensive private arrangements (“besloten
vennootschap”, administratiekantoren, etc.).
In Belgium, the Latin holding culture is still alive, the bank and its management
depending on a limited number of reference shareholders (Renneboog, 1997).  This
dependence is qualified but not suppressed by the restrictions imposed on the
shareholders by authorities through the “protocol on the autonomy of the banking
Finally, most Luxembourg banks being subsidiaries or branches of important foreign
banks, managers are very much dependent on the mother corporation or the head-office
of their group.
(iv) The three countries are overbanked, but not in the same way and with the same
pressure on profitability.  The pressure on profitability seems to be highest in Belgium,
because it is due to a very high ratio of branches (747 in 1996) per 1,000,000
inhabitants.  However, the impact of the overbranching is mitigated by the small number
of employees per branch (on average 3,5 !) (see table 1).
In Luxembourg overbanking is profitable because it refers to the number of banks, not of
branches.  They nearly all depend on banks abroad and have their own customers.
In the Netherlands, the process of consolidation of banks and branches (see table 1)
began earlier than elsewhere.  The effect was not primarily a drastic reduction of the
number of credit institutions (172 against 134 in Belgium and … 214 in Luxembourg) but
a concentration of more than 75 % of the assets in the five largest banks, of which 3 are
top international players (see table 1).
(v) In spite of the differences in the number of banks, a few big banks - ABN-AMRO and
Rabo in the Netherlands, the “Seven Sisters”, now reduced to five in Belgium - are
predominant on the domestic market (70 to 80 % of customers’ markets).  Both
countries have had to face the issue of big banks in small countries.  Their expansion
abroad has been oriented differently, mostly in a radius of 400 km around Brussels and
in a few international financial centers for Belgian banks; worldwide for ABN-AMRO.
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Except for the three top Dutch banks, all “elephants” in their respective home markets
are medium-sized at the European level and minor players at the world level.
When taking in account all the differences just mentioned, the question inevitably arises
whether the problems of transition to full EMU have to be dealt with, separately for each
system or globally for the whole Benelux area.
The view which I will develop is that under the pressure of banking with a single currency, a
set of specific problems emerge for the area as a whole.
Dutch top banks are focusing on Belgium as their second or common domestic market or as
the centre of their European operations; with much hesitation Belgian banks are giving up
their “stand alone” policy; as already mentioned, Luxembourg is slowly moving to an on-
shore status where geographical proximity and shareholders relations are driving forces for
full integration in the Benelux area.  However, as will be shown in the case study on the
Belgian Generale Bank, this development meets with institutional resistance, which slows
down the pace and the regularity of this move towards convergence.
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TABLE 1 - KEY FIGURES BENELUX COUNTRIES (a)
Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg Date-Source
Macro-economic figures
1.Population (mio) 15,57 10,17 0,416 1997-Eurostat-STATEC
2.GDP (mia ECU) 318,3 213,7 14,5 1997-Eurostat-STATEC
3.GDP as % of GDP-Euro 11 5,70 % 3,90 % 0,30 % 1997-EMI-STATEC
4.GDP per inhabitant (ECU) 20.392 20.998 34.222 1997-Eurostat
5.Unemployment rate 4,0 % 8,8 % 3,4 % June 98-Eurostat-BCL
6.Inflation rate 1,4 % 0,7 % 0,4 % Dec. 98 y/y - Eurostat
7.General Government Deficit (% of GDP) - 1,4 - 2,1 +1,0 1997-Eurostat-EMI
8.General Government Gross Debt (% of GDP) 72,1 122,2 7,1 1997-Eurostat-EMI
9.Exchange rate (1 ECU = …) 2,23 40,72 40,72 Q2 98-
Datastream
10.Short term interest rate - 3 months 3,57 3,71 - Q2 98-
Datastream
11.Long term interest rate - Benchmark 10 Y 4,93 5,027 5 % Q2 98-
Datastream
Banking
12.Number of credit institutions 172 134 214 1997-
ABB Vademecum-BCL
13.Number of foreign banks 62 73 207 1977-
ABB Vademecum
14.Number of branches per 1 mio inhabitants 284 747 214 (b) 1996-NBB
15.Number of bank employees per 1 mio inhabitants 7.250 7.500 21.752 (c) 1996-NBB
16.% of government debt held by banks 28 % 61 % 41 % 1996-NBB
17.Concentration ratio :
C3 in % of total balance
67,5 35,3 1996-NBB
18.Concentration ratio :
C5 in % of total balance
76,2 53,1 1996-NBB
19.Bank employment 76.939 21.752
20.Total assets (mia ECU) 635 684 1996-NBB
21.Total assets (% BBP) 256 326 1996-NBB
22.Gross foreign assets/Total assets 33,3 46,2 96,5 1996-NBB
23.ROE 14,6 % 13,3 % 15 % 95/96-ABB-BCL
24.ROA 0,50 % 0,31 % 0,40 % 95/96-ABB
25.Risk assets ratio 11,1 11,3 12,4 1996-ABB
26.Number of banks in top 50 (Tier 1 capital)
100
200
300
3
3
5
5
0
2
7
7
0
0
0
0
1997-The Banker
27.Number of banks in top 50 (Total assets)
100
200
300
3
3
5
5
1
4
7
7
0
0
0
4
1997-The Banker
Insurance
28.Number of insurance companies 491 255 81 1995-CDV
29.Number of employees per company 81 100 17 1995-CDV
30.Premiums per employee (ECU) 685.169 446.837 585.736 1995-BVV0
31.Premiums per inhabitant (B=100) 157 100 356 1994-CEA
32.Insurance level (Premium per inhabitant/
GDP per inhabitant (B=100)
148 100 282 1994-CEA
Stock Exchange
33.Number of quoted national companies 185 143 1996-NBB
34.Market capitalisation (mia ECU) 518,8 162,7 30,5 May98-FESE
35.Stock value of quoted national companies
(% of GDP)
162 % 76 % 219 % Own calculations
Notes : (a) Information provided by the Research Department of Artesia Bank, Brussels and the Ministry of Finance, Luxembourg.
(b) Number of branches per 416.000 inhabitants.
(c) Number of bank employees per 416.000 inhabitants.
Abbreviations : ABB : Association Belge des Banques; NBB : National Bank of Belgium; CDV :Controle Dienst der Verzekeringen; BCL : Banque
Centrale de Luxembourg; EMI : European Monetary Institute; CEA : Comité Européen des Assurances; FESE : Federation of
European Stock Exchanges.
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2.2 THE IMPACT OF EUROLAND : A GLOBAL OVERVIEW
The sensitivity to the banking aspects of full EMU, to banking with a single currency,
developed much earlier in Belgium than in the Netherlands.  Several factors were at work.
The political commitment to a full EMU, including the single currency, has always been
stronger.  In the financial sector some Belgian banks - Kredietbank, Generale Bank - have
played a leading role in promoting the ecu, the forerunner of the euro.  Ecu transactions and
ecu clearing have been developed as profitable “niche playing”.
In this context, when full EMS came in for discussion, the consensus was reached rapidly
that banking with a single currency was the future.  The new opportunities provided by
Euroland would compensate for the transitional costs and for the loss of forex income from
intra-zone currency transactions.  A cooperative effort of authorities and the private sector
was launched to set up and to implement “un schéma de place” for the Brussels financial
centre.
In the Netherlands, traditional pragmatism, a wordwide rather than a continental European
outlook, and Anglo-Saxon influence led for a good deal of Euroscepticism in the financial
community, at least with respect to the single currency aspect of full EMU.  The “conversion”
came later, but was effective.
Finally, in Luxembourg much attention went out towards establishing a credible Luxembourg
central banking component in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and towards
the implications of full EMU for fiscal harmonisation.  It was (rightly) felt that when the veil of
different national currencies would be lifted by the single currency, tax discrimination and
privileges would be questioned even more, because “Le roi fiscal sera tout nu” !.
If Dutch banks were slow in recognising the impact of the introduction of a single currency,
they were by far the first to initiate au onomous restructuring by consolidation, diversification
and foreign acquisitions.  They were among the first in Europe to succeed, in the early
nineties, in merging the numbers one and two of their banks into the ABN-AMRO, in this way
creating a global player at the world level.  The strength of their institutional investors -
insurance companies and pension funds - was transformed into bancassurance
conglomerates like FORTIS and ING.  The outcome is that, although the Dutch banks were
slow to believe in the single currency, they are now the best prepared banks to meet the
structural requirements of full EMU.
Their process of domestic consolidation has now practically been concluded, at least at the
top.  Four groups are now starring in the Dutch show :
- ABN-AMRO (primarily banking)
- The FORTIS GROUP which now comprises FORTIS NL, its insurance pivot and FORTIS
B, its banking pivot
- ING, grouping NMB (banking), POSTBANK (banking), NATIONALE NEDERLANDEN
(insurance)
- RABOBANK, which has absorbed ROBECO, a very important fund manager but did not
succeed to merge with ACHMEA, one of the top Dutch insurers.
Meanwhile, important means have been accumulated for a worldwide expansion through
mergers and acquisitions.  In the first part of the nineties, Dutch banks (together with the
Spanish banks) were already the record buyers in M and A operations abroad.
The transition to full EMU has refocused their attention to European markets (Van der
Linden, 1998).  Belgium has been targeted in the first place as a second or common
domestic market (ING and ABN-AMRO), as a springboard to France and Southern Europe
(ING) and even as the centre of their European activities (ABN-AMRO).  In the second place
FORTIS-AMEV has engaged in a partnership with AG-24 in Belgium in order to build a
Dutch-Belgian Group of bancassurance.  Thirdly, attempts, not very successful up to now,
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have been made to penetrate into Southern Europe in a significant and direct way (ABN-
AMRO has failed to acquire CIC in the context of French privatisations, but is a significant
player on the Italian scene).
In contrast with the Dutch experience, the Belgian record of autonomous restructuring
through domestic consolidation and external growth has been chiefly disappointing, until
recently.
Up to early 1997 autonomous restructuring was limited to :
- the absorption of small institutions, often savings banks, by larger ones.  Typical
examples of such transactions are the absorption of the savings banks EURAL and
UNISPAR by PARIBAS BANK BELGIUM and the absorption of the BANK VAN
ROESELARE and the savings bank SPAARKREDIET by KREDIETBANK (number 3 on
the banking list).  More important was the acquisition of the CREDIT LYONNAIS
NEDERLAND by the GENERALE BANK;
- the setting-up of partnerships and joint ventures, partly in the context of privatisation of
public credit institutions;
- BANQUE DE LA POSTE, through a 50-50 % stake of the POST OFFICE and the
GENERALE BANK;
- DEXIA, associating CREDIT COMMUNAL DE BELGIQUE et CREDIT LOCAL DE
FRANCE through a stake of 50 % in each other’s operating units;
- most of all, FORTIS AG acquiring CGER and SNCI in the context of privatisation and
setting up a Dutch-Belgian conglomerate of bancassurance with FORTIS-AMEV.
Apart from those cases, only an impressive list of failures can be mentioned :
- the failure to merge AMRO and GENERALE BANK in 1990;
- the failure to integrate BBL into ING in 1992;
- the failure to set up “the” big Belgian Bank through the merger of GENERALE BANK (n°
These failures are due to conflicting interests between shareholders, to conflicts between the
“stand alone” approach of the management and the plans of major shareholders to
disengage themselves, and finally to personal rivalries among some of the main actors.
Observers have identified these failures as the decline and even the end of “Belgian
capitalism” based on holding culture, political pressures and vested interests.
Since early 1997, however,  four big cases have radically changed the Belgian scene.  We
list them in their chronological order, which happens to be their order of increasing
importance :
- Spring 1997 : acquisition of a majority stake in the highly profitable PARIBAS BANK
BELGIUM by the ARCO-BACOB BANK (n° 7) GROUP, the financial institution of the
Christian Social Movement in Belgium.  This transaction illustrates the retreat of French
banking groups (PARIBAS, to be followed by SUEZ-LYONNAISE DES EAUX in the
GENERALE BANK case) from the Belgian scene;
- November 1997 : acquisition of BBL (n° 2) by ING; up to now, this transaction seems to
head for success.  ING respects the specificity of BBL in Belgium and integrates BBL-
people as full partners in its organisation.  The latter are happy to be members of a
worldwide international credit institution.
- February 1998 : merger between KB (n° 3), CERA (n° 6), ALMANIJ (holding) and ABB
(insurance).
This is a highly impressive project since it realises an integration at four levels :
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* at the bank level, as a rationalisation project of two branch networks without a
significant loss of customers and in a favourable social climate;
* at the level of bancassurance, because it promotes a formula of integrated financial
services;
* at the level of holdings, by integrating ALMANIJ and ABB, not only as controlling
entities but hopefully also as providers of risk capital and equity;
* at the international level, where the new conglomerate may become a significant
player via partnership with RABO BANK;
- Spring 1998 : the struggle between the FORTIS Group and ABN-AMRO to control the
GENERALE BANK (n° 1).  Ultimately, the battle was won by Fortis in June-July.  This
illustrates the many contradictions of Belgian capitalism, but it also initiates a new era on
the Dutch scene, because the implicit “non-aggression” pact among the leading Dutch
financial groups has been violated.
Following the worldwide pattern in merger activity in the wake of the mid-summer financial
crisis, operations in the Benelux area subsided somewhat in the second semester of 1998.
Notable exceptions were :
- the take-over of the ANHYP Bank by the insurance group AXA through its subsidiary
ROYALE BELGE and the planned merger of ANHYP with IPPA Bank within the AXA
Group;
- the acquisition of very active CREDIT LYONNAIS BELGIUM by DEUTSCHE BANK.  This
ends the apparent neglect of the Benelux area by leading German banks.  The previous
CL Belgium will operate under the name Deutsche Bank.  Its aggressive marketing is
already being felt by competitors.
For evident reasons, Luxembourg banks do not play a significant role in these developments.
But they undergo the outcome and the consequences of the operations in their respective
groups.  Each merger or acquisition at the level of the mother company or the head office
has its repercussions on the subsidiaries and branches in Luxembourg.  In this way, the
Luxembourg scene is a “derivative” of those in the neighbouring countries.
The transition to full EMU, the prospect of banking with a single currency is obviously not the
only determinant of the many kinds of restructuring which we are trying to analyse.  But it
acts as a catalyst of underlying forces of consolidation and diversification, which were
already at work in the Netherlands at the beginning of the present decade but which
exploded only recently in Belgium.  In this way bank strategies in the Benelux area tend to
converge.
2.3 CASE STUDY  I : THE ABN-AMRO CASE (THE NETHERLANDS)
2.31 INTRODUCING THE TWO CASE STUDIES
In the following paragraphs we focus on the two N° 1’s in the Benelux area : ABN-AMRO in
the Netherlands, the Generale Bank in Belgium.  They have - at least partly - a common
origin and a common “Founding Father”, King William I, who ruled the United Kingdom of the
Netherlands from 1815 until 1830.  His kingdom amalgamated Dutch and Belgian provinces
(Van der Wee and Verbreyt, 1997).  As “the last enlightened despot and the first champion of
the modern industrial society in the Low Countries” (ibidem, p. 14), he forced, in the 1820’s,
the foundation of :
- De Nederlandse Handelsmaatschappij (The Netherlands Trading Society), which was at
the origin of the later ABN;
- De Generale Maatschappij (the later Belgian Société Générale), which was at the origin of
the Generale Bank;
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- De Nederlandsche Bank, which was to become the Dutch central bank.
The two case studies have the same structure : historical background - present profile and
strategy - recent moves.  The key statistical and accounting data are presented in separate
tables.
2.32 ABN-AMRO’S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As emphasised by De Leeuw (1996), ABN-AMRO is a “continuous process of mergers and
acquisitions”, which are spread over more than 300 years.  After World War II, the main
events were :
- in 1964, the merger of the Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij (1824) with the
Twentsche Bank (1861) to constitute the Alg mene Bank Nederland (ABN);
- also in 1964, the merger of the Amsterdamsche bank (1871) and the Rotterdamsche
Bank (1863) to constitute the AMRO-Bank;
- in 1991, the merger between the ABN-Bank and the AMRO-Bank to constitute the ABN-
AMRO Bank.
The ABN-component had developed an extensive international activity and an international
network.  The AMRO-component had a more domestic focus.  On the occasion just
mentioned, the private banking institutions of ABN (Mees and Hope) and AMRO (Pierson)
were merged in MeesPierson, but sold to the Fortis-Group in 1996.
This short survey illustrates the strong focus on external growth in the Dutch banking
tradition.
In my opinion, this can be explained, at least partly, by the corporate governance system in
the Netherlands.  The shareholdership of the bank is often dispersed and has a limited
impact on the managers.  In M and A operations, managers have much decision power and
act quite independently, in a rather pragmatic way to adjust the structure of their banking
firms to new domestic and international conditions.
2.33 ABN-AMRO’s PRESENT PROFILE AND STRATEGY
As emphasised in the KALFF Interview (Euromoney, 1997), the merger of 1991 - which
occurred after the unsuccessful attempt to merge AMRO and Generale Bank in a Benelux
cross-border operation - was a “marriage of necessity”.  The driving forces were to increase
local market share and to build on the combined commercial and financial strengths in order
to grow internationally.  The dominant idea was that the growth potential of Dutch banks was
rather limited on the mature domestic market and that it had to be found outside the
Netherlands (Nawas, 1996).  So, the combined number of branches in the Netherlands has
been gradually reduced form about 1.400 at the beginning of the decade to 967 by the end of
1997 (see table 2A).
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TABLE 2 - DATA ON ABN-AMRO
2AKEY FIGURES 1997
UNITS Bn NLG Bn ECU %
1. EMPLOYMENT
worldwide
of which : Netherlands
76.749
34.071
2. BRANCHES AND OFFICES
wordwide
of which : Netherlands
1.888
967
3. NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHERE
PRESENT
71
4. EQUITY
group
bank
53,0
25,8
23,8
11,6
5. TOTAL ASSETS 836,4 375,4
6. CUSTOMER DEPOSITS 396,7 178,1
7. OPERATING PROFIT (before tax) 5,79 2,60
8. NET PROFIT (after tax)
total
to shareholders
3,85
3,67
1,73
1,65
9. RATIOS
ROE
cost/income
risk asset
total
tier I
non performaning loans/total
private sector loans
amounts written off/private sector
loans
15,7
69,1
11,36
6,96
1,59
0,28
10. CREDIT RATINGS FITCH-IBCA
short term
long term
A1+
AA+
Source : ABN-AMRO Report 1997.
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2BRANKINGS OF THE BANKER : ABN-AMRO AND ITS COMPETITORS IN THE NETHERLANDS
AT THE END OF 1997
N° world
ranking
Strength Size Sound-
ness
Profits Performance BIS
Tier I
capital
Tier I
capital
m $
Total
assets
m $
Capital/
Assets
%
Pre-tax
m $
Profits on
average
capital
%
ROA
%
Cost/
Income
%
Ratio
%
1. ABN-AMRO
2. RABOBANK
Nederland
3. ING Bank Group
4. BANK NEDERLANDSE
GEMEENTEN
5. FORTIS BANK
Nederland
6. SNS BANK
Nederland
8
18
35
187
189
350
15.864
12.680
8.730
1.751
1.738
815
414.654
209.692
190.269
58.971
38.680
17.094
3,83
6,05
4,59
2,97
4,49
4,77
2.868
1.416
1.278
168
267
97
19,3
11,7
15,5
9,9
17,4
13,3
0,69
0,68
0,67
0,29
0,69
0,57
69,1
79,9
74,0
19,4
75,3
73,7
10,65
11,10
10,77
28,00
10,80
14,30
Source : The Banker, July 1998.
Another important move was towards developing investment banking besides and in
combination with commercial corporate banking.  This started in 1992 by the acquisition of
Hoaring Govett, a small investment bank subsidiary  of the Bank of America in London, and
was followed by the acquisition of other entities in Milan, Madrid, France and Scandinavia,
but also by intensive internal growth (Kalff Interview, 1997).
Now, ABN-AMRO is a top international group, which ranks 8th on the World Ranking List of
The Banker 1998 (see table 2B) and 4th on its Regional Ranking for Western Europe.  Its
soundness and performance indicators 1997 were quite remarkable for an expansionary
institution (capital/assets ratio of 3,83, BIS risk/asset ratio : 10,65, profits/average capital :
19,3, ROE : 12,83, see table 2A and 2B).  In 1998, ABN- MRO has significantly felt the
impact of the crisis in many emerging markets.  Hence, its Moody’s rating has been recently
reduced.
Its present profile can be summarised in two features :
- universal banking : doing everything in commercial and investment banking, market
activities, private banking, wholesale and retail.  However, ABN-AMRO wants to remain a
bank and not to merge banking and insurance;
- worldwide banking : ABN-AMRO is present in 71 countries and in the main international
financial centres.  However, in commercial banking its two main markets are the
Netherlands and the US, especially the Midwest.  In investment banking ABN-AMRO is
an “Amlo affair” : Amsterdam-London.  Up to now, ABN-AMRO has no distinctive
Euroland profile.
ABN-AMRO aims to belong to the top-5 universal banks worldwide by combining strong
organic growth with selective acquisitions.  In a number of countries it wants to develop all
banking activities on the basis of a strong market position, which supposes that it should
belong to the top 3 to 5 in that country.  It concentrates trading and investment banking in
four regional centres (Amsterdam/London, Chicago/New-York, Singapore and Hong Kong)
but it also has more than 60 local trading rooms.
Finally - and this links up with the main theme of the present paper - ABN-AMRO wanted to
play a leading role in the euro-zone. This ambition is justified.  In the more unified markets of
the euro-zone the size effect will be at work and will favour ABN-AMRO.  As the 4th larg st
Western European Bank it will be able to play a significant role in the euro-payments system
17.
and to accept operations and risks on a European scale.  It will also enjoy the so-called short
list-effect, being chosen among a limited number of competing banks for the syndication of
mega-loans and for large deals on the primary equity and bond market.
RECENT MOVES IN EUROLAND
Nevertheless, although the group is present in all the countries of the zone, that leading role
is still wishful thinking.  Its penetration into Germany is disappointing, and two recent
important moves, one in France and one in Belgium (Generale Bank), have proved to be
unsuccessful.  Why ?
The attempt to take over the “Crédit Industriel et Commercial” in France in the context of the
CIC’s privatisation raised the traditional suspicion of the French authorities concerning
handing out a major French institution to a foreigner, even though this foreigner is a Euro-
partner.
The failure to take over the Belgian Generale Bank is a much more complicated issue, which
will be discussed into more detail in the next paragraphs.
At the moment, we limit ourselves to stating that this failure is much more surprising than the
French one because ABN-AMRO’s offer :
- was made in a country with a tradition of open-door policy;
- was not a mere attempt to absorb a Belgian bank and its network.  The proposal was to
localise the management of all European commercial activities of the group - including
those in the Netherlands themselves - at the Generale Bank in Brussels, which would
become a new European division in ABN-AMRO’s organisation;
- was favoured by the management and the majority of the staff members at the Generale
Bank, when it appeared that the traditional “stand alone” policy could no longer be
maintained.  Under these circumstances, management and staff members preferred to be
integrated into a worldwide organisation with no overlapping network in Belgium;
- did not clash with the offer of an exclusively domestic Belgian competitor but with that of a
Belgian-Dutch Group : Fortis.  This broke up the consensus model on which Dutch
banking was established;
- was financially attractive : it provided not only for exchange of shares, but also for
additional cash.
2.34 CONCLUDING THE ABN-AMRO STUDY
The ABN-AMRO case shows that a bank can develop into a worldwide organisation, even if
it has to start from a small and slowly growing domestic base.  But this requires
(i) supplementing organic growth by continuous external acquisitions
(ii) strong management.
ABN-AMRO’s worldwide expansion did not, until very recently, focus primarily on the eur -
zone.  Its top management probably shared the Dutch initial scepticism about the
introduction of the euro.  When Euroland became a prospective reality rather than a vague
dream, the Group tried to integrate the euro-approach into its worldwide strategy.  Logical
steps in view of that aim were to penetrate much more into the two key countries of the euro-
zone : Germany and France, and to enlarge the domestic base to include Belgium.
But the Group handled at least the Belgian case in a rather undiplomatic way, with some
improvisation and a bit of arrogance, which aroused the suspicion by traditional Belgian
circles of that “Anglo-Saxon cowboy style”.  This sapped the credibility of an attractive
approach which tended to :
(i) recognise the Benelux countries as a specific area inside the euro-zone;
(ii) to enlarge the domestic base of the ABN-AMRO Group
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(iii) to set up a specific European division located on an Amsterdam/Brussels basis for
managing commercial operations in the euro-zone as a whole.
Together with the impact of their involvement in emerging markets, the institutional
resistance to this approach has recently mitigated the interest of the ABN-AMRO managers
in enlarging their domestic base southwards in Europe.
2.4 CASE STUDY  II : THE GENERALE BANK CASE  (BELGIUM)
2.41 THE GENERALE BANK’S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Twice in a decade, the destiny of Belgium’s N° 1 bank was at stake.  The first time was in
1988, when the de Benedetti “raid” on the Société Générale de Belgique (SGB) - the mother
holding company of the bank - resulted in a transfer of control to the French Suez Group.  A
second crucial period was the first semester of 1998, when the Suez Group - after its merger
with Lyonnaise des Eaux - decided to concentrate its interests on the public utilities sector
and no longer considered its stake of 29,7 % in the Generale Bank (through SGB) as a
strategic investment (see figure 2).  As a consequence of the planned disinvestment by
Suez, the Generale Bank became the battle field of two prospective buyers, the Dutch-
Belgian Fortis Group and ABN-AMRO.  The former had links with Suez and SGB, the latter
had good connections with the Generale Bank’s management.
This makes it likely that the history of the Generale Bank (GB) is not dominated, as ABN-
AMRO is, by successive mergers and acquisitions under the pressure of markets and
competitors.  Very often, the driving factor was the relation between the bank and its major
“reference” shareholders.  This is typical of the Belgian holding culture, in which, after the
Latin tradition, shareholdership is much more concentrated than in the Anglo-Saxon
countries and the Netherlands.
For more than a century, from 1822 until 1934, the Société Générale, first Dutch, afterwards
Belgian, did not experience that tension between shareholders and managers.  It was a
“banque mixte”, which not only practised commercial banking but controlled the major part of
Belgium’s industry.  The Great Depression of the 1930’s put an end to this dubious “mix”,
and led to a split, imposed by the authorities, between commercial banking and controlling
holding company activities.
The institutional implication of that split was the separation between a holding company - the
Société Générale de Belgique - and the banking firm which, in 1965, went by the name of
Société Générale de Banque, after a significant intra-group merger.  In 1985, this was
shortened to Générale de Banque, Generale Bank.
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FIGURE 2- CHANGES IN THE HOLDING STRUCTURE OF GENERALE BANK 1998
BEFORE 06.06.98 06.06.98 31.07.98 FUTURE
63,4 % 63,4 %    100 % 100 %
19,4 % ** 29,7 % ** 25,4 %  **       27,0 % *   25,4 % * 20 % *
           2,5 %      11,4 %
 74,9 % 74,9 %    74,9 % 98,2 % 100 %       100 %
Note : * SGB stands for Société Générale de Belgique and daughter companies
** including direct stakes of SL in Fortis and Generale Bank
Source : - Offre publique d’échange par Fortis AG
- Press Releases and Comments
FORTIS-AG
GENERALE
BANK (GB) FORTIS-AG
GENERALE
BANK (GB)
SOCIETE GENERALE
DE BELGIQUE (SGB) *
SUEZ-LYONNAISE
DES EAUX (SL)
ASLK-CGER
SUEZ-LYONNAISE
DES EAUX (SL)
SOCIETE GENERALE
DE BELGIQUE (SGB) *
SUEZ-LYONNAISE
DES EAUX (SL)
SOCIETE GENERALE
DE BELGIQUE (SGB) *
FORTIS-AG
SUEZ-LYONNAISE
DES EAUX (SL)
SOCIETE GENERALE
DE BELGIQUE (SGB) *
FORTIS-B
ASLK-CGER ASLK-CGER
GENERALE
BANK (GB) ASLK-CGER
GENERALE
BANK (GB)
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At the beginning, the holding company was very powerful : “The bank emerged from the split
in 1934 as the poor cousin of the group, with very slender resources and only a very limited
degree of autonomy (Van der Wee and Verbreyt, 1997, Section 9.3, The Great Paradox).
But the situation changed over time.  The holding company stagnated and, from the 1960’s
on, it had to bear the burden of the crisis in Belgium’s traditional industries.  The bank, on the
contrary, prospered, it expanded nationally and internationally and became less dependent
on the holding company.  Its growth was mostly internal and organic, except for the
important 1965 merger between the Generale Bank, the Banque d’Anvers and the Société
Belge de Banque.  All three had links with the Société Générale.  In this way and to a certain
degree, this merger can be considered as an intra-group operation.
The autonomy of the bank vis-à-vis its reference shareholders - in the first place vis-à-vis the
SGB - was bolstered by the authorities.  The Banking Commission promoted protocols on
the “autonomy of the banking function” (1960, 1974, 1992).
This growing autonomy favoured a stand-alone policy which was only temporarily interrupted
under the threat of the de Benedetti raid on the Société Générale (1988).  In a defensive
mood, merger negotiations were started with AMRO Bank.  As soon as the threat decreased,
the project was abandoned.  What might have been the first important cross-border
bankmerger in the European Union has never come true.
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TABLE 3 - DATA ON GENERALE BANK
3AKEY FIGURES 1997
UNITS Bn BEF Bn ECU %
1. EMPLOYMENT
consolidated group
non consolidated
27.200
14.932
2. BRANCHES AND OFFICES
wordwide
Belgium
1.328
1.064
3. NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHERE
PRESENT
46
4. EQUITY
consolidated
non consolidated
137
103
3,35
2,53
5. TOTAL ASSETS
consolidated
non consolidated
5.912
4.077
144,99
99,96
6. CUSTOMER DEPOSITS AND
CERTIFICATES
consolidated
non consolidated
3.496
2.119
85,71
51,96
7. OPERATING PROFIT BEFORE TAXES 29,9 0,73
8. NET PROFIT
consolidated
non consolidated
17,1
10,6
0,42
0,26
9. RATIOS (consolidated)
ROA
ROE
cost/income
non performing loans/private sector loans
amounts written off/private sector loans
risk asset total
 tier I
pay-out ratio
0,30
12,83
60,3
2,44
0,28
11,36
6,01
53,4
10. CREDIT RATINGS FITCH-IBCA
short term
long term
financial stability
F1+
AA
B
Source : - Generale Bank, Annual Report 1997
- Prospectus offre publique d’échange par Fortis AG sur Générale de Banque.
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3BRANKINGS OF THE BANKER 1998 : GENERALE BANK
AND ITS COMPETITORS IN BELGIUM AT THE END OF 1997
N° world
ranking
Strength Size Sound-
ness
Profits Performance BIS
Tier I capital Tier I capital
m $
Total assets
m $
Capital/
Assets
%
Pre-tax
m $
Profits on
average
capital
%
ROA
%
Cost/
Income
%
Ratio
%
1. GENERALE BANK
2. KREDIETBANK
3. BBL
4. ASLK-CGER (a)
5. CERA (b)
6. BACOB BANK
93
104
126
142
156
184
4.176
3.588
2.877
2.464
2.120
1.770
160.136
112.898
111.970
82.334
45.170
71.347
2,61
3,18
2,57
2,99
4,69
2,48
862
589
528
480
208
192
21,6
18,0
19,8
20,4
10,6
13,7
0,54
0,52
0,47
0,58
0,46
0,27
60,3
56,7
69,1
55,1
75,2
62,0
11,36
10,80
11,26
11,03
11,69
12,19
(a)to be merged with Generale Bank in 1999 to become FORTIS BANK
(b)merged in 1998 with KREDIETBANK
3CDERIVED AGGREGATES (unconsolidated) AND RATIOS
N° world
ranking
Strength Size Soundness Profits
Tier I capital Tier I capital
m $
Total assets
m $
Capital/Assets
%
Pre-tax
m $
3C 1
1. GENERALE BANK + ASLK-CGER
2. KREDIETBANK + CERA (KBC)
3C 2
GENERALE BANK
as % of AMRO
GENERALE BANK + ASLK-CGER
as % of AMRO
as % of KBC
51
61
6.640
5.708
26,3
41,9
116,3
242.470
158.068
38,6
58,5
153,4
2,74
3,61
1.342
797
30,1
46,8
168,4
Source : The Banker, July 1998.
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The stand-alone policy was resumed and complemented by some foreign acquisitions, the
most important being the acquisition of the ailing Crédit Lyonnais subsidiary in the
Netherlands.  However, after the take-over of the Société Générale by the Suez Group, the
shareholdership of the Bank became more and more unstable; together with economic
factors such as worldwide globalisation of banking and the prospects of the euro-zone, this
finally undermined the stand-alone policy favoured by past tradition and present
management.
2.42 THE GENERALE BANK’S PROFILE AND POLICIES
The Generale Bank is not a worldwide universal bank like ABN-AMRO.  At the end of 1997 it
ranked 93th in the Banker’s World Ranking list (see table 3B) and 41th in its Regional
Ranking of Western Europe.  Its ranking is somewhat higher when not tier I capital
(“strength”) but total assets (“size”) is chosen as basis for the ranking.  Its soundness and
performance have substantially improved in recent years (capital/assets 1997 : 2,61; BIS risk
asset ratio : 11,36; profits on average capital : 21,6, ROE : 12,83 - see table 3A and 3B).
Before being taken over by Fortis in June 1998, the Generale Bank’s ambition was to be a
solid European Regional Bank (Van der Wee and Verbreyt, 1997) with a few strongholds
outside Europe, especially in Hong Kong and Africa, and with some presence in the major
international financial centres.  Its policies were based on the “four concentric circles” theory
around Brussels :
1. Belgium, the domestic market;
2. The neighbouring countries within a radius of 400 km around Brussels;
3. The rest of Europe;
4. The other continents (Annual Report 1997).
The project of the euro-zone contributed to stressing the interaction between the first two
circles as well as the necessity to enlarge the domestic base by acquisitions in the
neighbouring countries (acquisition of the Banque Parisienne de Crédit and of the Crédit
Lyonnais Nederland, increase of the stake in Banque Générale du Luxembourg, etc.).  But
the bank had to retreat from the competition on the French CIC rather early, before the final
round.  The efforts of the management clashed with the views and the financial means of the
most important shareholder : Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux.  Gradually it became clear that the
SL-Group no longer considered the Generale Bank as a strategic investment and that, as
already mentioned, it preferred to foster its control of the public utilities sector in Belgium by
increasing, up to 100 %, its stake in the Société Générale de Belgique, which is also the
holding company controlling Tractebel, the core of the public utilities sector in the country.
2.43 RECENT MOVES : THE GENERALE BANK AS A BATTLEFIELD BETWEEN FORTIS AND
ABN-AMRO
For several years the Belgian component of the Belgian-Dutch financial group Fortis, Fortis
AG, wanted to build a bancassurance entity with the Generale Bank.  It had links with the
bank, mainly through the SGB (see figure 1).  It had acquired, as active player in the Belgian
privatisation process, the control of two former public credit institutions : ASLK-CGER and
NMKN-SNCI.  The latter was absorbed in ASLK in 1997.
However, as the President of Fortis put it : you must be two to dance the tango.  The
management of the bank consistently refused to associate itself with this strategy of
bancassurance.  It resisted every invitation to give up its stand alone policy.  It even had
serious reservations about the idea of its shareholders and of the Belgian authorities to build
“the big Belgian bank” with BBL (which was at that time N° 2 in Belgium) and maybe with
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Meanwhile, the approaching prospect of the euro-zone increased the fear that, standing
alone, even a national N° 1 of the size of the Generale Bank, would become a minor and less
significant player on a European banking scene with a single currency.
This constituted the background to resume negotiations.  The wish of Suez-Lyonnaise to
liquidate its stake in the Generale Bank acted as a catalyst.  Negotiations were re-initiated
between SL, SGB and Fortis without immediate involvement of the managers and much
hesitation on their part afterwards.  The project was strongly supported by the Belgian
political and financial establishment.  Oddly enough, it was promoted as a big Belgian Bank
“bis”, while it is, in fact, part of the Benelux strategy of a Dutch-Belgian entity : Fortis.  Finally,
the management gave in on May 12th and endorsed the proposal of an exchange of shares :
7 Fortis AG against 3 Generale Bank.  ANB-AMRO joined the competition too late, but with a
more attractive proposal, including cash (cf. supra).  This counterbid met with much criticism
and resistance in traditional Belgian circles.  But the Generale Bank management reversed
its position and supported the ABN-AMRO bid.  The Banking Commission accepted both
bids for a procedure of public offering.  Fortis finally won the battle even before the opening
of the official public offering : on June 5th Fortis made a new bid, which topped the ABN-
AMRO offer by about 6 %.  At the same time, the Board of Generale Bank, led by the
reference shareholders, officially considered the ABN-AMRO bid as hostile and issued a
poison pill by increasing the bank’s capital by 10 %, reserving the increase for SGB and its
allies.  One day later, ABN-AMRO withdrew from the race, utterly disgusted.  The end of the
story was standard :
- a public exchange of shares of SGB against SL shares (1/1) in June, which raised the
stake in SGB up to the targeted 100 %
- a public exchange of shares + cash + guarantees on the basis of 7 Fortis against 3 GB in
July, which, in two stages, raised the stake of Fortis in GB to 98,2 % (see figure 2).
The outcome of the battle has important implications for the structure and the working of
financial markets in the Benelux-area :
- it forced the Fortis Group to re-examine and strengthen its internal structure.  The various
entities of the Group are redeployed around a banking pivot located in Belgium (Fortis-B)
and an insurance pivot centered in the Netherlands (Fortis-N).  The process of integrating
the main components in one single entity, the “FORTIS BANK” will be spread over a
period of five years;
- in the banking group, the planned merger between Generale Bank and ASLK-CGER,
complemented by MeesPierson and VSB, creates an entity which will rank in the 50’s in
the World Ranking list of the Banker and be a significant player in the euro-zone.  The
present overlapping of the branch networks of the Generale Bank and ALSK-CGER - the
last 25,1 % of its capital having been acquired at the end of 1998 - requires an intensive
cost-cutting operation by closing at least 500 branches and crossing out at least 2.000
jobs.  Cost-cutting is all the more required since it has to compensate for the high price
that Fortis had to pay to acquire the control of the Generale Bank;
- the Generale Bank case raises many serious questions about the adequacy of the
institutional structure and corresponding procedures in Belgium.  In the private sector the
future of SGB as 100 % daughter of SL and as intermediate holding of Suez-Lyonnaise
Group in Belgium is uncertain.  On the financial markets, some interventions have not
been “marktconform” and quite a number of loopholes and uncertainties have been
detected in the legislation and the procedures.  The lack of transparency and the
loopholes in the “rules of the game” have been sharply criticised not only by ABN-AMRO
but also in the Dutch press and in the Dutch public opinion (the “Belgian coup”);
- in the Netherlands, the rift between Fortis and ABN-AMRO has, at least temporarily,
broken the implicit consensus among Dutch banks;
- in the whole Benelux area the banking atmosphere has become more aggressive as a
consequence of the Generale Bank case.
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2.43 CONCLUDING ON THE GENERALE BANK CASE-STUDY
The Generale Bank study leads to some paradoxical conclusions about the impact of the
euro-project on banking strategy in the Benelux area.  It confirms that the prospect of the
euro-zone has induced a more aggressive approach in bank strategies.  This  mainly applies
to the Dutch banks.  But at the same time, it highlights the institutional resistance to cross-
border M and A, primarily in Belgium.  This resistance is a source of disappointment for
worldwide-oriented banks like ABN-AMRO, which are now tempted to return to a lower
profile in their European strategy.
The Generale Bank case also illustrates the problems which arise when strategic decisions
are not based on a consensus between shareholders and management.  This mainly applies
to countries with a culture of reference shareholders.  It is less relevant in cases where
shareholdership is dispersed and managers have great decision power.
Finally, the Generale Bank case shows the limits even of a well designed and well managed
stand-alone policy when a wave of M and A dramatically raises the size of your competitors
and threatens to cross you of the list of significant players, even in a geographically limited
area like the radius of 400 km around Brussels.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
In conjunction with other forces like technological and globalisation, the transition to full EMU and to
banking with a single currency induces a shift from defensive bank strategies to more aggressive
ones.
This shift is reflected predominantly in the present wave of mergers and acquisitions either at the
domestic or the cross-border level.  External growth is considered as a condition for ultimate survival
in many bank strategies.  This changes the structure and the working of many financial markets and
confirms our main thesis that the transition to full EMU will have more lasting effects than the SMP-
project of the early Nineties.
The rationale behind the M and A is not only mere size, but also accelerated cost-cutting and
penetration into foreign domestic customers’ markets, which was previously hampered by defensive
and ultimately self-defeating strategies of strengthening the national domestic base.
In the Benelux area, the penetration of Dutch banks into the Belgian domestic market is a striking
example of this kind of strategy.
In my opinion, this does not lead, in customers’ markets, to a uniform market in the euro-zone but to
(supra)regional financial markets which are no longer determined by national borders and a national
currency, but by geographic, cultural and linguistic proximity.
However, in the present process of consolidation, the factors of institutional resistance, even in small
neighbouring countries, should not be underestimated.
As exemplified by the first 1999 bankmergers (BCH and Banco Santander in Spain, Société
Générale and Paribas in France), it is therefore probable that in many countries of the euro-zone,
important M and A will primarily remain domestic, at least in the next few years.  At any rate, cross-
border restructurings will increase only gradually, the Benelux area and Scandinavia being either
exceptions, or testcases for the future.  This should not be regretted in all aspects.  It may, at least,
prevent M and A based on pure megalomania and emotional herding effects.  Ultimately, such
operations lead to abuse of power and to operational inefficiency.  This is not what we should expect
from EMU and from that fantastic  endeavour of countries which, half a century ago, had just finished
fighting each other in a bitter way and are now going to share the same currency, not by domination,
but by consensus and free decision.
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